SB 6095
In CommitteeSenate
Political violence
Protecting elected officials and candidates, executive state officers, election officials, and criminal justice participants against threats and incidents of political violence.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill strengthens protections against political violence by making threats against elected officials, election officials, and criminal justice participants a higher-level crime and by allowing those individuals to keep their residential addresses confidential. It also authorizes and funds personal security measures for legislators and other public officials to help protect them from threats related to their official duties.
- Increases penalties for harassment of elected officials, election officials, and criminal justice participants when the harassment is related to their official duties—making it a class C felony instead of a gross misdemeanor in those cases.
- Expands eligibility for the state’s address confidentiality program to include elected officials, election officials, criminal justice participants, and executive state officers who are targeted for threats or harassment related to their official duties.
- Allows elected officials, election officials, criminal justice participants, and executive state officers to request redaction of their residential address from public records (e.g., campaign finance reports, voter registration records, property records).
- Authorizes legislators to use their member business expense accounts or the new legislative member security account to pay for personal security measures—including hardware, software, cybersecurity tools, and professional services—needed because of threats related to their official duties.
- Makes security-related records (e.g., video/audio from security cameras, personal security plans) confidential and exempt from public disclosure when created by or for legislators, elected officials, or other covered individuals.
Who is affected
- Elected officials — They can request redaction of their residential address from public records and may be eligible for the state's address confidentiality program if targeted for threats or harassment related to their official duties.
- Election officials — They can request redaction of their residential address from public records and may be eligible for the address confidentiality program if targeted for threats or harassment related to their official duties.
- Criminal justice participants — They can request redaction of their residential address from public records and may be eligible for the address confidentiality program if targeted for threats or harassment related to their official duties. This includes law enforcement, prosecutors, corrections staff, judges, and others listed in the bill.
- Legislators — They can use campaign funds or legislative expense accounts to pay for personal security measures (e.g., alarms, cameras, cybersecurity tools, security personnel) needed because of threats related to their official duties.
- Executive state officers — They may be eligible for the state's address confidentiality program if targeted for threats or harassment related to their official duties, and their residential address may be redacted from public records.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
Elevating harassment of election officials, criminal justice participants, and elected officials to a class C felony (from gross misdemeanor) when related to official duties increases deterrence and provides stronger legal tools for prosecution—protecting individuals who perform essential democratic functions and may be targeted for political reasons.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(2)(b)(iii), (iv); Sec. 1(3); Sec. 2(1)(b), (c)Allowing elected officials, election officials, criminal justice participants, and executive officers to confidentially hide their residential addresses across multiple record systems (voter registration, property records, campaign finance, financial disclosures) significantly reduces the risk of doxxing, stalking, and targeted violence against these individuals and their households.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 2(2); Sec. 2(1)(b), (c); Sec. 13(2); Sec. 14(1)(a); Sec. 15(3)(a); Sec. 23(1)(b)-(f)Authorizing legislators and other covered officials to use public or campaign funds for personal security measures—including cybersecurity tools, alarm systems, and professional security services—addresses rising threats to public officials and helps ensure they can perform duties without fear of physical or digital harm.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 4(2)(a)-(d); Sec. 18(g)(i); Sec. 19(4)(a); Sec. 20; Sec. 21Expanding eligibility for the state’s address confidentiality program to include elected officials, election officials, and criminal justice participants—many of whom are women, people of color, or LGBTQ+ individuals—provides critical safety infrastructure to vulnerable groups who face disproportionate targeting in public service.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 1(2)(b)(iii), (iv); Sec. 1(3); Sec. 2(1)(b), (c)Standardizing address redaction procedures across voter registration, property records, and financial disclosures creates consistency for county auditors and assessors—though it adds administrative burden, it also clarifies legal obligations and reduces inconsistent or arbitrary redaction practices.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 2(2); Sec. 13(2)(d); Sec. 14(1)(d); Sec. 15(3)(d); Sec. 23(1)(b)-(f)
Potential Concerns (5)
Creating broad confidentiality exemptions for security-related records—including video/audio from security cameras, personal security plans, and other materials—limits public oversight of how public officials use security resources and could hinder investigative journalism and accountability for misuse of authority or excessive security measures.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 4(3)(a); Sec. 20(4)(a); Sec. 21(4)(a); Sec. 23(1)(g)Redacting residential addresses across multiple public record systems (voter rolls, property records, campaign finance reports, financial disclosures) creates administrative complexity and potential inconsistencies across agencies, increasing costs and workload for county auditors, assessors, and the Public Disclosure Commission—resources that could be better used for core public services.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 4(3)(b); Sec. 20(4)(b); Sec. 21(4)(b); Sec. 23(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h)By making security plans and recordings confidential and exempt from public disclosure, the bill may reduce transparency around law enforcement and legislative security operations, potentially obscuring patterns of over-policing, misuse of security resources, or failures in threat assessment—especially concerning how security is deployed in communities of color or low-income neighborhoods.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 4(3)(a); Sec. 20(4)(a); Sec. 21(4)(a); Sec. 23(1)(g)The bill’s confidentiality provisions for security records and addresses could set a precedent for expanding non-disclosure of government operations, weakening public access to information about how elected officials protect themselves—and potentially normalizing secrecy around government functions that should be subject to democratic scrutiny.
Rights & LibertiesLean peopleRef: Sec. 4(3)(a); Sec. 20(4)(a); Sec. 21(4)(a); Sec. 23(1)(g)The requirement to notify officials when their address is requested under public records law—and the prohibition on delaying production—creates logistical burdens for local governments and may incentivize over-redaction or delays in compliance, increasing legal and administrative risk for county offices.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Sec. 4(3)(a); Sec. 20(4)(a); Sec. 21(4)(a); Sec. 23(1)(g)
Who Is Most Affected
Elected officials (state legislators, county council members, city council members, school board members) gain access to confidential address protection and public funding for security measures, significantly reducing personal and familial risk. However, they face increased administrative requirements and potential political scrutiny if security measures are perceived as excessive or misused.
Criminal justice participants—including law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and corrections staff—gain stronger legal protections against harassment and the ability to hide residential addresses, reducing risk of retaliation or violence. However, they may face increased stress from heightened threat levels and potential targeting due to their roles in enforcing laws.
Election officials (county auditors, clerks, poll workers) gain stronger legal protections and address confidentiality, which is critical given the surge in threats since 2020. However, many are volunteers or part-time workers without institutional support for security, limiting their ability to fully utilize the new tools.
Local governments (counties, cities, special districts) face new administrative burdens—reviewing redaction requests, coordinating with state agencies, and implementing new confidentiality protocols—without additional funding. This strains already limited resources, especially in rural or under-resourced jurisdictions.
Journalists and researchers lose access to residential addresses and security plans of public officials, which may hinder investigative reporting on government conduct, security spending, or potential abuses of power. However, the bill does not block reporting on official actions or policy decisions.