ESSB 6086
In CommitteeSenate
Judicial security
Strengthening security for Washington state judicial officers and court personnel.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill strengthens protections for judicial officers, court staff, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement, corrections staff, and election officials by banning the online publication of their personal information when it poses a safety threat, expanding harassment and cyber harassment penalties when targeting these individuals because of their work, and authorizing threat assessments and access to confidential records for safety planning.
- Prohibits publishing eligible individuals’ personal information online if it poses a threat to their safety, and requires websites and data brokers to remove such information within 10 business days of a request.
- Expands the definition of 'eligible individuals' to include judicial officers, court clerks, public defenders, prosecutors, corrections staff, and election officials.
- Increases penalties for harassment and cyber harassment when directed at criminal justice participants or election officials performing their duties—making it a class C felony instead of a gross misdemeanor in certain cases.
- Authorizes supreme court bailiffs and court security consultants (from the Administrative Office of the Courts) to conduct threat assessments and access nonconviction criminal history records for that purpose.
- Expands eligibility for the address confidentiality program to judicial officers, court staff, law enforcement, corrections staff, prosecutors, public defenders, and election officials who face threats due to their official duties.
Who is affected
- Judicial officers — Judicial officers (judges, justices, commissioners, magistrates, administrative law judges) gain stronger protections against having personal information published online and increased access to threat assessments and address confidentiality.
- Court personnel — Court staff (clerks, bailiffs, administrators) and other court personnel gain expanded eligibility for address confidentiality and stronger legal protections against harassment and online exposure of personal information.
- Prosecutors and public defenders — Prosecutors, public defenders, and their staff gain enhanced legal protections against harassment and threats, including elevated penalties for harassment targeting them due to their official duties.
- Law enforcement and corrections staff — Law enforcement officers, corrections staff, and other criminal justice participants gain expanded protections under harassment and cyber harassment laws, including eligibility for address confidentiality and clearer legal consequences for threats made because of their official actions.
- Election officials — Election officials gain new legal protections against harassment and cyber harassment, including eligibility for address confidentiality and enhanced penalties when targeted for performing their duties.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
Provides judicial officers, court staff, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement, corrections staff, and election officials with a legally enforceable mechanism to compel removal of personal information (e.g., home address, phone number, photos of residence) from the internet within 10 business days — significantly reducing risk of doxxing, stalking, and targeted violence against individuals performing high-risk public duties.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(3); Sec. 3(3); Sec. 4(3); Sec. 5; Sec. 6Elevates harassment and cyber harassment of criminal justice participants and election officials from gross misdemeanors to class C felonies when the harassment is motivated by their official duties — strengthening deterrence and enabling more serious prosecution of threats that could disrupt core democratic functions (e.g., election administration, courtroom proceedings).
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 3(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv); Sec. 4(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv)Expands eligibility for the state’s Address Confidentiality Program (ACP) to include judicial officers, court staff, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement, corrections staff, and election officials facing threats — enabling them to legally use a substitute address for mail, voter registration, and employment records, reducing exposure to stalkers or retaliatory actors.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 3(3); Sec. 4(3); Sec. 5; Sec. 6Authorizes court security consultants and supreme court bailiffs to conduct threat assessments and access nonconviction criminal history records — enabling proactive risk mitigation for judges and other court personnel, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases where threats may escalate.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 5; Sec. 6Clarifies that threats against election officials and criminal justice participants are criminalized when motivated by their official actions — protecting the integrity of elections and judicial proceedings from intimidation, especially in polarized environments where election denialism or anti-prosecutor sentiment is rising.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1); Sec. 3(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv); Sec. 4(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv)
Potential Concerns (5)
Expands access to nonconviction criminal history records (including arrests without conviction, dismissed charges, and acquittals) for court security consultants and supreme court bailiffs to conduct threat assessments, potentially increasing the risk of misuse or overreach in surveillance of individuals who have not been convicted — especially concerning due process and privacy rights of people who were never charged or were cleared by courts.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(3), (4)(c), (4)(e), (4)(g), (4)(h), (4)(i); Sec. 2; Sec. 3(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv), (3); Sec. 4(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv), (3); Sec. 5; Sec. 6; Sec. 7(8)(a), (8)(b)Imposes new operational and compliance obligations on local law enforcement agencies (e.g., responding to removal requests within 10 business days, implementing threat assessments, reporting outcomes), which may strain already limited local resources — especially in rural or underfunded jurisdictions without dedicated security or legal staff.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1), (3); Sec. 3(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv); Sec. 4(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv); Sec. 5; Sec. 6Exposes data brokers, websites, and small online platforms to liability and compliance costs (e.g., removal requests, attorney fees, statutory damages up to $1,000/day) for failing to remove personal information, even if they are unaware of the recipient’s identity or threat context — disproportionately burdening small tech firms and independent content hosts.
Business & EmploymentPeopleRef: Sec. 1(2); Sec. 1(3); Sec. 2Elevates penalties for harassment and cyber harassment when directed at certain professionals (e.g., prosecutors, judges, election officials) based on their job performance, potentially chilling legitimate political speech, criticism of public officials, or advocacy — especially when the line between protected dissent and unlawful harassment is ambiguous or subject to subjective interpretation by law enforcement or courts.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1); Sec. 3(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv); Sec. 4(2)(b)(iii), (2)(b)(iv)Creates a new private right of action with statutory damages ($1,000/day) and attorney fees for violations of the internet information removal mandate, incentivizing aggressive litigation by plaintiffs’ firms against websites and data brokers — potentially leading to over-enforcement or strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) even in borderline cases.
Business & EmploymentPeopleRef: Sec. 1(2); Sec. 1(3); Sec. 2
Who Is Most Affected
Judicial officers (judges, commissioners, magistrates) gain strong protections against doxxing and enhanced threat assessment capacity, but may face increased public scrutiny or accusations of overreach if threat assessments are perceived as politically motivated or overly broad.
Election officials — especially in swing counties — gain critical protections against coordinated harassment campaigns, but may face heightened political pressure or legal challenges if their eligibility for ACP or threat assessments is contested.
Small data brokers, local websites, and independent bloggers face new compliance burdens and liability exposure, especially if they lack legal resources to respond to removal requests or assess legal risk — potentially chilling legitimate public records publishing.
Local law enforcement agencies (sheriffs, police departments) gain new responsibilities for threat response and record verification, but may lack staffing or training to implement new protocols — especially in rural jurisdictions.
Defendants, activists, and journalists may face chilling effects when reporting or criticizing public officials — especially if their speech is mischaracterized as harassment, even when no true threat is present.