HJR 4209
In CommitteeHouse
Congressional redistricting
Concerning congressional redistricting between decennial censuses.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill proposes a constitutional amendment to replace the current legislative redistricting process with a new commission-based system. The commission would draw district boundaries every 10 years, with strict rules to prevent gerrymandering and limits on who can serve. If the commission fails, the Washington State Supreme Court would take over.
- Establishes a new independent redistricting commission to draw state legislative and congressional district boundaries every 10 years (starting in 2031).
- The commission would have five members: two appointed by each of the two largest parties in each legislative chamber, and a fifth nonvoting chairperson selected by the first four members.
- Bars current or recently active elected officials and party officers from serving on the commission (with limited exceptions, such as precinct committee persons).
- Requires the commission to complete its plan by November 15 of years ending in one; if it fails, the Washington State Supreme Court must step in by April 30 of the following year.
- Gives the legislature power to amend the commission’s plan—but only with a two-thirds vote in both chambers—and only within 30 days of the commission’s submission.
- Allows the legislature to modify congressional districts mid-decade—but only if another state does so for non-court-ordered reasons—and only with a simple majority vote.
Who is affected
- Washington state voters — Voters will elect or reject a constitutional amendment that changes how legislative and congressional district boundaries are drawn, potentially altering how their votes are counted in future elections.
- Top legislative leaders of the two largest parties — Leaders of the two largest political parties in each legislative chamber will each appoint one voting commission member, giving them direct influence over redistricting leadership.
- Former elected officials and political party officers — Individuals with recent political experience (e.g., former elected officials or party officers) may be barred from serving on the redistricting commission, limiting who can participate in map-drawing.
- Washington State Supreme Court — The Washington State Supreme Court will gain new authority to appoint commission members if appointments are delayed and to create a backup redistricting plan if the commission fails to reach agreement.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
The commission-based system, with its strict procedural and substantive constraints (e.g., population equality, no partisan favoritism), is likely to reduce gerrymandering and produce districts that more accurately reflect voter distribution, thereby strengthening equal voting rights and political representation for everyday Washingtonians.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Section 1 (establishes commission to draw districts every 10 years); Section 5 (population equality, compactness, contiguity, and prohibition on partisan discrimination)The inclusion of the Washington State Supreme Court as a fail-safe ensures continuity and prevents gridlock, protecting against legislative inaction or partisan obstruction that could disenfranchise voters in future elections.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Section 6 (Supreme Court must adopt a backup plan by April 30 of year ending in two if commission fails); Section 2 (Supreme Court appoints members if appointments are delayed)By requiring appointments from both major parties and excluding current officeholders, the design encourages cross-partisan negotiation and reduces direct incumbent control over map-drawing—though imperfect, this structure is more likely to produce neutral outcomes than the current legislative-led process.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Section 2 (four voting members appointed by top leaders of two largest parties; fifth nonvoting chair selected by first four); Section 2 (excludes current/elected officials and party officers, with narrow exception for precinct committee persons)The bill requires legislative funding for the commission, which could increase state administrative costs—but these are one-time, transparent, and modest relative to broader state spending, and the cost is necessary to ensure an independent process.
FinancialLean peopleRef: Section 4 (‘The legislature shall enact laws providing for the implementation... and appropriate funds’); Fiscal Impact noteCentralizing redistricting litigation authority in the state Supreme Court increases consistency, reduces forum-shopping, and ensures that legal challenges are resolved by a nonpartisan judicial body rather than federal or lower courts, enhancing fairness and predictability.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Section 10 (Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over all redistricting cases); Section 6 (Court’s authority to adopt plan if commission fails)
Potential Concerns (5)
The commission’s structure gives disproportionate influence to top party leaders in each chamber to select members, and the requirement that three of four voting members agree to appoint the fifth chair creates a de facto veto for any two-party consensus, potentially entrenching two-party dominance and limiting minority-party input.
Local GovernmentRef: Section 2 (2nd sentence: 'By January 31st... three, shall appoint the remaining member'); Section 2 (last sentence: 'If any appointing authority fails... supreme court shall make the required appointment')The ban on current and recently former elected officials and party officers excludes experienced political actors from participation, potentially reducing the pool of qualified candidates and increasing reliance on less experienced or less diverse appointees, which may weaken the commission’s technical and political legitimacy.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Section 2 (prohibiting elected officials and party officers from serving, with exception for precinct committee persons); Section 2 (two-year lookback ban on former officials)The prohibition on favoring or discriminating against ‘any political party or group’ is ambiguous and unenforceable without clear metrics, and the 3-of-4 voting requirement may lead to deadlock or compromise plans that dilute minority voting power in practice, especially in racially polarized areas.
Rights & LibertiesLean peopleRef: Section 5 (‘The commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposely to favor or discriminate against any political party or group’); Section 6 (‘At least three of the voting members shall approve such a redistricting plan’)The 30-day legislative amendment window and two-thirds supermajority requirement for amendments creates a high but not insurmountable barrier to legislative override, potentially reducing legislative accountability while still allowing partisan gerrymandering if both chambers achieve two-thirds majorities in the same party.
Local GovernmentRef: Section 7 (‘The legislature may amend the redistricting plan but must do so by a two-thirds vote... within 30 days’); Section 8 (reconvening commission for mid-decade modifications requires two-thirds vote)The mid-decade congressional redistricting provision—triggered by actions in *other* states and executable by simple majority—creates a backdoor for partisan redistricting and could lead to reactive, unstable district maps that undermine the goal of depoliticizing the process.
Local GovernmentRef: Section 9 (allows legislature to amend congressional districts mid-decade if another state does so for non-court-ordered reasons, by simple majority)
Who Is Most Affected
Voters benefit most when districts better reflect actual voter preferences; this plan reduces gerrymandering risk, increasing electoral responsiveness and trust in outcomes.
Top legislative leaders gain appointment power over half the commission, but lose unilateral control over redistricting—net effect is mixed: influence without dominance.
Former officials and party officers are largely excluded, limiting their participation in redistricting—this is negative for those with political experience who wish to serve, but positive for reducing incumbent entrenchment.
The Washington State Supreme Court gains new authority over appointments and backup redistricting, expanding its role in elections—but this is constrained by deadlines and statutory limits, making the impact mostly neutral-to-positive for judicial independence.
Minority-party legislators and candidates face higher barriers to influence redistricting, as the commission’s structure favors majority-party appointees—this is a negative impact on their ability to shape district boundaries.