HB 2576
In CommitteeHouse
Address confidentiality prg.
Concerning the address confidentiality program.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill expands Washington’s Address Confidentiality Program to cover more at-risk groups — including election officials, criminal justice participants, and health care providers — and strengthens protections for participants’ real addresses. It clarifies application requirements, improves interagency coordination, and adds new support for anonymous property ownership to help participants build safe housing.
- Expands eligibility for the Address Confidentiality Program to include election officials, criminal justice participants, and health care providers who face threats or harassment, in addition to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking.
- Clarifies that program participants must submit a sworn statement under penalty of perjury confirming their eligibility and fear for safety, and must disclose whether they believe they were victimized by a law enforcement employee.
- Requires the Secretary of State to issue a substitute address and forward mail to participants, and mandates that state and local agencies accept that substitute address in place of the participant’s real address for most purposes (e.g., voter registration, driver’s license, vehicle registration).
- Strengthens confidentiality protections: actual addresses are exempt from public records requests, and the Secretary of State may only share participant files with law enforcement under strict conditions (e.g., written request, no indication of law enforcement involvement in the abuse).
- Adds new authority for the Secretary of State to partner with civil legal aid to help participants buy property anonymously — including through nonprofits or corporations — to establish safe housing, with no cost to participants.
Who is affected
- Victims of domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking — Individuals who are victims of domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking can apply for the program to hide their actual address and use a substitute address for government services, voting, and mail delivery.
- Election officials, criminal justice participants, and health care providers — Election officials, criminal justice participants, and health care providers who face threats or harassment may qualify for the program to protect their residential and work addresses from public disclosure.
- State and local government agencies — State and local agencies (like licensing, elections, and courts) must accept the substitute address in place of a participant’s real address for most purposes and must keep the real address confidential.
- Nonprofit agencies and application assistants — Nonprofit agencies and counselors who assist applicants with applications receive training and serve as points of contact for the program.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
Expands eligibility to election officials, criminal justice participants, and health care providers facing threats—groups previously excluded—greatly enhancing their ability to safely perform public service without fear of retaliation, especially in polarized political or medical environments.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 1, Sec. 3(1)(a)Strengthens confidentiality by making actual addresses exempt from public records requests and ensuring voter rolls do not disclose participant addresses—critical for preventing stalking, doxxing, or targeted harassment of vulnerable individuals.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 5(3), Sec. 6(2)Authorizes anonymous property ownership through nonprofits or corporations to help participants establish safe housing—addressing a key gap for survivors seeking long-term stability without exposing their location.
HousingPeopleRef: Sec. 9Requires sworn statements under penalty of perjury and allows application assistants (not just state staff) to help—reducing barriers for applicants with limited literacy, language access, or mobility, especially survivors in rural or underserved areas.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 3(1)(c)(i), Sec. 3(3)Mandates that all state and local agencies accept the substitute address for voter registration, driver’s licenses, and vehicle registration—ensuring seamless, consistent access to essential services without revealing real location.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 5(1), Sec. 5(2)
Potential Concerns (3)
Mandates that applicants disclose whether they were victimized by a law enforcement employee, potentially deterring victims of police-perpetrated abuse from applying due to fear of retaliation or lack of trust in the system.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 3(1)(c)(ii)The 72-hour notice requirement for address changes and automatic cancellation if forwarded mail is returned may disrupt safety planning for participants in rapidly evolving danger situations, especially those fleeing dynamic threats like human traffickers or organized groups.
Public SafetyLean peopleRef: Sec. 3(3)The property ownership provision relies on partnerships with civil legal aid and does not allocate new funding—meaning access to this benefit depends on local availability of legal aid, which is uneven across Washington, potentially leaving rural and low-income participants underserved.
HousingRef: Sec. 9
Who Is Most Affected
Victims of domestic violence, stalking, trafficking, etc. gain stronger, broader protections under the program—especially those who previously fell outside the original eligibility (e.g., election officials, health care workers). However, the perjury requirement and law enforcement disclosure clause may deter some from applying.
Election officials and health care providers—especially those in conservative or polarized communities—gain critical protection against doxxing and threats, enabling them to serve without fear. However, the requirement to disclose if victimized by law enforcement may deter some from applying.
State and local agencies gain clear legal authority to accept substitute addresses and must keep real addresses confidential—reducing administrative burden and legal risk. However, they must implement new internal protocols and train staff, which may strain under-resourced offices.
Nonprofits and application assistants gain formal recognition and training authority, strengthening their role in survivor support. However, they must absorb additional responsibilities (e.g., verifying eligibility, maintaining confidentiality) without new funding, potentially stretching thin existing capacity.