2SHB 2333
In CommitteeHouse
Political violence
Protecting elected officials and candidates, executive state officers, election officials, and criminal justice participants against threats and incidents of political violence.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill strengthens protections against political violence by enhancing criminal penalties for threats or harassment targeting elected officials, election officials, and criminal justice participants, and by allowing them to keep their residential addresses confidential. It also authorizes security measures—including physical and cybersecurity tools—for legislators and provides funding mechanisms for such protections.
- Enhances harassment laws to classify threats or harassment against elected officials, election officials, and criminal justice participants—especially when related to official duties—as class C felonies.
- Expands the state address confidentiality program to allow elected officials, election officials, criminal justice participants, and their household members to apply to have their residential addresses replaced with a state-designated address to protect against threats.
- Authorizes security assessments and personal security measures for legislators, including nonstructural devices (e.g., alarms, cameras), structural modifications (e.g., gates, fencing), cybersecurity tools, and professional security personnel, with costs covered by legislative expense accounts or campaign funds.
- Protects residential addresses from public disclosure in multiple contexts—including voter registration, campaign finance reports, financial disclosure statements, and property records—by allowing redaction upon request and limiting exceptions to express consent or news media requests.
- Creates a new legislative member security account to fund security measures for legislators, with strict rules on eligible expenses and reimbursement requirements upon leaving office.
Who is affected
- Elected officials — They may apply to have their residential address replaced with a state-designated address to protect against threats, and their household members are included in this protection.
- Election officials — They may apply for address confidentiality and are protected under enhanced harassment laws when targeted due to their official duties.
- Criminal justice participants — They may apply for address confidentiality and face enhanced penalties if threatened or harassed because of their official duties.
- Legislators — They may request security assessments and use public funds for personal security measures, including cybersecurity tools and physical safeguards, at public expense.
- Executive state officers — They may be eligible for the address confidentiality program if targeted due to their official duties, and their residential information is protected from public disclosure.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
Elevates threats against elected, election, and criminal justice officials to class C felonies, increasing penalties and enabling stronger prosecutorial responses to politically motivated harassment.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 2(b)(iii), (iv); Sec. 9A.46.020(2)(b)(iii), (iv)Expands the state address confidentiality program to cover elected, election, and criminal justice officials—and their households—allowing them to replace residential addresses with state-designated mail drops, significantly reducing doxxing and physical stalking risks.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 2(a)(b), (c), (d); Sec. 40.24.030(1)(b)-(d)Authorizes cybersecurity tools (e.g., address removal from data broker sites, credit monitoring) for legislators, protecting against digital doxxing and identity theft tied to official duties.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 4(2)(d); Sec. 20(1); Sec. 21(1)Creates a dedicated legislative security account to fund security measures, ensuring consistent, non-political budgeting for legislator safety and reducing reliance on ad hoc or campaign-funded solutions.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 20(1); Sec. 21(1)Mandates notice to officials before their residential addresses are disclosed to news media, giving them time to assess threats and coordinate with law enforcement—while still allowing disclosure, balancing transparency and safety.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 12(b)(ii); Sec. 13(b)(ii); Sec. 14(c)(ii); Sec. 15(b)(ii); Sec. 16(b)(ii); Sec. 23(1)(a)-(f)
Potential Concerns (5)
Redacts security footage (e.g., doorbell cameras, bodycam feeds) from public records, preventing public oversight of how security systems are used to monitor public spaces near officials’ homes.
Public SafetyRef: Sec. 4(3)(a)Makes all records created by personal security measures (e.g., logs, access records, system diagnostics) confidential and exempt from public disclosure, limiting transparency into security operations and potential misuse.
Public SafetyRef: Sec. 4(3)(b); Sec. 20(4)(b); Sec. 21(4)(b)Requires legislators to reimburse the state for the residual value of security assets upon leaving office, creating administrative burden for legislative finance offices and potentially disincentivizing security adoption due to personal financial liability.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 20(3); Sec. 21(3)Prohibits use of public or campaign funds to pay family members for security services, potentially limiting hiring flexibility for legislators who rely on family-run security firms or informal arrangements—though large firms remain eligible.
Business & EmploymentRef: Sec. 20(1); Sec. 21(2)Shifts responsibility for security assessments from local law enforcement to legislative sergeant-at-arms or state patrol, potentially straining state resources and creating inconsistent standards across jurisdictions.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 4(1); Sec. 20(1); Sec. 21(1)
Who Is Most Affected
Elected officials gain strong protections against doxxing and physical threats, with confidential addresses and access to funded security tools. However, they face administrative obligations (e.g., reimbursement for residual asset value) and may be subject to increased scrutiny over security spending.
Election officials benefit from expanded address confidentiality and enhanced harassment penalties, reducing risks of voter suppression or intimidation. However, they may face increased workload in managing confidentiality applications and responding to media requests.
Criminal justice participants (e.g., prosecutors, judges, corrections staff) gain robust protections against politically motivated threats, especially for those handling high-profile cases. However, they may face privacy trade-offs if their addresses are inadvertently exposed in overlapping records.
Legislators gain unprecedented access to public funds for personal security—including cybersecurity—reducing reliance on campaign funds. However, they face personal liability for asset residual value and new ethical constraints on spending.
The general public benefits from stronger protections for election integrity and reduced risk of political violence targeting officials. However, public oversight of security operations is reduced due to confidentiality provisions, and local governments may face new administrative costs.