HB 1745
In CommitteeHouse
Election audits
Ensuring election integrity at the county level.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill requires counties to conduct manual hand-count audits of the 2024 general election using independent companies selected jointly by Democratic and Republican party chairs. It mandates audits in at least 12 precincts per county (plus more if needed to cover 5% of ballots), allows public observers, and requires a report to the legislature by the end of 2025.
- Requires a manual hand count audit of ballots in at least 12 precincts per county for the 2024 general election, with additional precincts added if needed to cover at least 5% of total ballots cast.
- Audit company must be selected by Democratic and Republican county party chairpersons—if they cannot agree, a coin toss decides.
- Each party selects six precincts for the audit; races or ballot measures audited may differ by precinct and are chosen jointly by the party chairs.
- Audits must compare manual hand counts of physical ballots to results from the county’s tabulation equipment.
- Public election observers must be allowed to watch all audit steps—including locating, sorting, counting, and reviewing duplicated/adjudicated ballots—and observe the final report.
- Audit reports must be submitted to the legislature by December 31, 2025, including findings and recommendations for future election integrity improvements.
Who is affected
- County party chairpersons — County Democratic and Republican party chairpersons must jointly select the audit company and precincts, and agree on which races or ballot measures to audit.
- Independent election auditing companies — Hired auditing companies must conduct manual hand counts of ballots in selected precincts and submit audit reports to the legislature.
- Public election observers — Members of the public who support or oppose candidates or ballot measures may observe the audit process and review duplicated/adjudicated ballots to verify accuracy.
- General public/voters — All Washington voters are affected because the bill aims to verify vote counts in elections, potentially increasing confidence in election outcomes.
Pro/Con Analysis
Potential Benefits (5)
Public observation and manual hand-count verification of ballots may increase voter confidence in election outcomes, especially among communities historically skeptical of election integrity, by making the audit process transparent and participatory.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 2(5), Sec. 2(6)Mandating a legislative report by December 31, 2025—including findings and recommendations—could yield actionable insights to improve future election auditing protocols, potentially leading to more robust, evidence-based election administration reforms.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(7)Requiring audits of at least 12 precincts (plus up to 5% of ballots) ensures a statistically meaningful sample and allows for targeted verification of races or ballot measures, increasing the likelihood of detecting tabulation errors if they exist.
Public SafetyLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(3)Joint selection of audit vendors by Democratic and Republican county chairs—especially with a coin-toss fallback—may reduce partisan bias in vendor selection and foster inter-party cooperation at the local level.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 2(2)(a)Allowing observers to watch all audit steps—including ballot sorting, counting, and adjudication—enhances transparency and may deter fraud or error, though this benefit is limited by the lack of independent statistical validation of audit findings.
Public SafetyLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(6)
Potential Concerns (5)
Mandates counties to conduct manual hand-count audits using independently selected vendors, creating significant new administrative and financial burdens on county election offices without state funding, potentially diverting staff time and resources from routine election operations and voter services.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 2(2)(a)Requiring audits of duplicated and adjudicated ballots with public access to those materials may expose sensitive voter information (e.g., unique handwriting, partial names, or ballot markings) to public view, raising privacy and potential harassment risks for voters whose ballots are flagged or duplicated.
Public SafetyRef: Sec. 2(3)The coin-toss tiebreaker for selecting audit vendors introduces randomness into a critical election security process, undermining procedural consistency and potentially eroding public confidence in the neutrality of the audit selection process.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 2(2)(a)Allowing public observers to examine duplicated and adjudicated ballots—including those with handwritten notes or marginalia—may expose election workers and voters to doxxing, intimidation, or targeted harassment if observer groups misinterpret or selectively leak ballot details.
Public SafetyRef: Sec. 2(6)The bill’s rushed timeline—requiring audits of a past election (2024) to begin within 30 days of enactment and report by year-end—creates logistical pressure on counties, risking rushed or incomplete audits, and may incentivize cutting corners in audit quality to meet deadlines.
Local GovernmentRef: Sec. 3 (effective date: Feb 28, 2025, but audit is for 2024 election)
Who Is Most Affected
County party chairs gain formal authority over audit vendor and precinct selection, but face added responsibility and potential conflict if partisan agreement proves difficult; this increases their political visibility and influence over election administration.
Auditing firms may gain new contracts, but their neutrality is compromised by the requirement that they be selected by partisan actors and the coin-toss tiebreaker; their work is time-bound and politically charged, with limited long-term contractual stability.
Public observers gain access to audit processes previously unavailable, but may be exposed to misinformation risks if they misinterpret ballot adjudication or duplication; partisan observers may use access to amplify distrust rather than verify accuracy.
Voters may gain short-term confidence boosts from visible audit transparency, but long-term trust depends on whether audits find no widespread errors—which is likely—and whether results are communicated clearly and without partisan distortion.
County election departments face significant new costs and staffing demands without state reimbursement, potentially diverting resources from voter education, registration maintenance, or accessibility improvements.