HB 1510
In CommitteeHouse
PERS/appeal commissioners
Concerning participation in the public employees' retirement system judicial benefit multiplier program by commissioners of the supreme court and court of appeals.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
This bill extends the same retirement benefit-purchasing options previously available to judges to appellate court commissioners in Washington State, allowing them to increase their retirement benefits for prior judicial or commissioner service. It also sets new benefit formulas for commissioners appointed after 2026.
- Allows current appellate court commissioners (supreme, court of appeals, and deputy commissioners) in PERS Plans 1, 2, and 3 to elect to increase their future retirement benefit multiplier by 1.5% (Plans 1/2) or 0.6% (Plan 3) per year of future service, starting in 2026.
- Permits those commissioners (and judges) who previously served in judicial or commissioner roles to purchase additional service credit at reduced rates (5% of salary + 5.5% interest for Plans 1/2; 2.5% + 5.5% for Plan 3) to increase their benefit multiplier retroactively, up to a cap of 75% (Plans 1/2) or 37.5% (Plan 3) of average final compensation.
- Establishes new one-time election windows: January–April 2026 for current commissioners in Plans 1/2, and January–April 2026 for Plan 3; plus June 2028 for past commissioners who left office but haven’t retired.
- Allows payment for purchased service credit via lump sum, rollover from another retirement plan, or transfer between retirement accounts—subject to federal tax rules.
- Sets the retirement benefit multiplier for new appellate court commissioners appointed after January 1, 2026, at 3.5% per year (Plans 1/2) or 1.6% per year (Plan 3), with the same overall benefit cap.
Who is affected
- State judges (supreme, appeals, and superior court) — Current or former Washington state supreme court justices, court of appeals judges, and superior court judges who served before 2026 and are members of PERS Plan 1, 2, or 3 may gain the option to increase their retirement benefit multiplier for prior judicial service.
- Appellate court commissioners (supreme and court of appeals) — Current or former Washington state supreme court, court of appeals, or deputy commissioners (non-judge judicial officers) who served before 2026 and are members of PERS Plan 1, 2, or 3 may gain the option to increase their retirement benefit multiplier for prior commissioner service.
- PERS members (Plan 1, 2, and 3) — State employees enrolled in PERS Plan 1, 2, or 3 who hold or have held judicial or commissioner positions may need to make elections or payments to purchase increased retirement benefits.
- Washington State Department of Retirement Systems — The Washington State Department of Retirement Systems will administer new election windows, benefit calculations, and payment options for commissioners and judges.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for concerns
Potential Benefits (5)
Enhancing retirement benefits for appellate court commissioners may improve retention and morale among judicial support staff, contributing to more stable and efficient court operations—which supports timely dispute resolution and rule of law, indirectly benefiting public safety.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(5), (6); Sec. 3(4), (5)By aligning retirement benefit structures for commissioners with those of judges, the bill may reduce turnover and attract qualified candidates to appellate-level commissioner roles, supporting continuity in judicial administration.
Business & EmploymentLean peopleRef: Sec. 1(5), (6); Sec. 3(4), (5)The bill includes actuarial safeguards—e.g., purchase price capped at actuarially equivalent value—intended to prevent overpayment, though historical precedent suggests such caps are often exceeded in practice.
FinancialRef: Fiscal Impact sectionThe extended election window in 2028 for former commissioners may provide fairness to individuals who left office before retirement but still contributed to the system, acknowledging career transitions in public service.
Public SafetyLean peopleRef: Sec. 1(7)(a), (b); Sec. 3(6)(a), (b)Standardizing benefit formulas for commissioners may simplify retirement planning and reduce administrative ambiguity for the Department of Retirement Systems and local court offices.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(3); Sec. 1(5), (6); Sec. 3(4), (5)
Potential Concerns (5)
The bill allows current and former appellate court commissioners and judges to purchase additional retirement service credit at below-market rates (e.g., 5% salary + 5.5% interest for Plans 1/2, 2.5% + 5.5% for Plan 3), which is significantly cheaper than actuarially fair pricing—effectively transferring value from the retirement system to high-income public employees.
FinancialIndustryRef: Sec. 1(2), (6), (7)(a); Sec. 3(2), (5), (6)(a)The 75%/37.5% benefit cap and retroactive service-purchasing options disproportionately benefit high-earning commissioners and judges who have long tenures and high final compensation—groups that are overwhelmingly wealthier than the general population and already well-compensated in public service.
FinancialIndustryRef: Sec. 1(2), (6), (7)(a); Sec. 3(2), (5), (6)(a)The bill may increase long-term state retirement system costs due to higher benefit payouts and administrative burden, potentially diverting funds from broader public services like education, healthcare, or housing—though the exact magnitude is uncertain and depends on uptake rates.
FinancialIndustryRef: Fiscal Impact section; Sec. 1(2), (6), (7)(a); Sec. 3(2), (5), (6)(a)By extending judicial-style benefit enhancements to non-judge commissioners, the bill creates a new tier of retirement benefits for a specialized subset of public employees, potentially undermining equity principles in public compensation and raising concerns about preferential treatment for a small, politically connected group.
Rights & LibertiesIndustryRef: Sec. 2(3); Sec. 1(5), (6); Sec. 3(4), (5)The June 2028 election window for past commissioners who have left office but not yet retired may disproportionately benefit those with longer careers and higher salaries—individuals more likely to have alternative retirement savings or private pensions—while offering little to no benefit to lower-income or earlier-retiring public workers.
FinancialLean industryRef: Sec. 1(7)(a), (b); Sec. 3(6)(a), (b)
Who Is Most Affected
Appellate court commissioners (especially those with 10+ years of service) are the primary beneficiaries—those who served before 2026 and remain employed may gain significant retroactive benefit increases at low cost, while those who left office before 2026 may have a limited window to do so.
Current and former judges who previously purchased service credit under earlier laws may gain little or no additional benefit, as the bill extends existing options rather than expanding them beyond prior caps—unless they are also commissioners.
PERS Plans 1 and 2 members who are current commissioners gain the most; those in Plan 3 gain less due to lower multipliers and caps, but still benefit. Non-judicial PERS members see no direct benefit and may indirectly bear costs through reduced public funding.
The Department of Retirement Systems will face increased administrative workload and potential actuarial risk from new election windows and benefit calculations, though the bill provides statutory clarity.
Taxpayers and general fund budget stakeholders may indirectly bear long-term costs if retirement system liabilities rise, potentially affecting funding for K-12 education, healthcare, or transportation—though the fiscal impact is uncertain and likely modest in the near term.