HB 1030
In CommitteeHouse
Counted ballot audits
Concerning the conduct of limited audits of counted ballots during the election certification period.
This status may be delayed. See Action History below for the latest updates.
How does a bill become law?
- Introduced: The bill is filed and assigned a number.
- Committee: A subject-matter committee holds hearings, takes public testimony, and decides whether to advance the bill.
- Floor Vote: The full chamber (House or Senate) debates and votes on the bill.
- Opposite Chamber: The bill repeats the committee and floor vote process in the other chamber.
- Governor: The Governor reviews the bill and decides whether to sign or veto it.
- Signed: The bill has been signed into law.
AI Analysis
HB 1030 strengthens postelection ballot auditing by requiring counties to conduct audits of duplicated ballots and choose between a limited hand-count audit or a risk-limiting audit before certifying election results. It also clarifies procedures for duplicating damaged ballots and expands observer access to audit processes.
- Allows county auditors to duplicate physically damaged or unreadable ballots—only if voter intent is clear and using teams of two or more people—while maintaining an audit trail with unique control numbers and logs.
- Requires county auditors to conduct an audit of duplicated ballots before election certification, comparing duplicates to originals.
- Mandates that, before certification, each county auditor conduct at least one type of postelection audit: either a limited hand-count audit of randomly selected precincts or batches (limited to one office/issue), or a risk-limiting audit using statistical methods to confirm the election outcome.
- Establishes detailed procedures for risk-limiting audits, including definitions for ballot comparison, ballot polling, and batch comparison types, and requires use of software approved by the Secretary of State that is independent of the original voting system.
- Requires the Secretary of State to adopt rules by January 1, 2025 governing all audit methods—including how discrepancies trigger expanded audits—and to establish procedures for public observation and reporting.
- Expands the authority for political party and campaign observers to observe audits, including limited hand-counts, and requires counties to maintain a list of willing observers ahead of elections.
Who is affected
- County auditors — County auditors must follow new procedures for duplicating damaged ballots, conduct audits of duplicated ballots, and choose one of two audit methods (limited hand-count or risk-limiting audit) before certifying election results.
- County canvassing boards — County canvassing boards must establish procedures for auditing duplicated ballots and for expanding audits if discrepancies are found.
- Political party and campaign observers — Political party representatives and campaign/organization observers gain explicit rights to observe audits, including limited hand-counts and risk-limiting audits, and must be allowed to attend if appointed and present.
- Voters with damaged ballots — Voters whose ballots are physically damaged may have those ballots duplicated to ensure their votes are counted, provided the voter's intent is clear and the original ballot is not altered.
- Secretary of State — The Secretary of State must adopt rules and procedures for all audit methods, including risk limits, audit expansion protocols, and software approval standards.
Pro/Con Analysis
Stronger case for benefits
Potential Benefits (5)
By requiring audits of duplicated ballots and mandating either a limited hand-count or risk-limiting audit before certification, the bill strengthens public confidence in election outcomes and reduces the risk of undetected errors affecting certification.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1), Sec. 2(2), Sec. 5(3)The duplication provision ensures that voters with damaged ballots retain enfranchisement—provided intent is clear—preventing disenfranchisement due to mechanical or handling errors, especially for elderly, disabled, or low-literacy voters.
Rights & LibertiesPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1), Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 5(3)Expanding observer access to audits—including for campaigns and organizations—enhances transparency and public trust, particularly for communities historically skeptical of election integrity.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 6(1), Sec. 6(2), Sec. 2(1)(a)Risk-limiting audits use statistically rigorous methods to confirm outcomes with quantifiable confidence levels, offering a more reliable and efficient audit than ad hoc checks—reducing the chance of undetected errors in close races.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 4(1), Sec. 4(2)(e), Sec. 2(1)(c)The requirement to compare duplicates to originals before certification creates a built-in quality control layer, reducing the risk that mis-tabulated or unreadable ballots lead to incorrect results.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1), Sec. 1(2), Sec. 2(2)
Potential Concerns (5)
The bill imposes new operational burdens on counties—including staffing, training, equipment, and time—for duplicating ballots and conducting audits, which may strain county election resources, especially in smaller or underfunded counties.
Local GovernmentPeopleRef: Sec. 1(1), Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 3(2)The requirement that limited hand-count audits be completed within 72 hours of election day may pressure counties to rush audits, potentially compromising accuracy or increasing error risk—especially in counties with high volumes of ballots or limited staff.
Public SafetyRef: Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 3(3), Sec. 3(4)The 72-hour deadline for completing hand-count audits may disproportionately burden rural counties with fewer staff and resources, potentially delaying certification and increasing uncertainty about election outcomes.
Public SafetyPeopleRef: Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 3(2), Sec. 3(4)The bill requires counties to adopt procedures for expanding audits upon discrepancy, but does not provide funding or standardized thresholds, leading to inconsistent implementation and potential legal challenges over audit expansion triggers.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 3(1), Sec. 3(3)The requirement that risk-limiting audits use software approved by the Secretary of State—and be independent of existing voting systems—may create procurement delays or vendor lock-in, especially for counties with legacy systems or limited IT capacity.
Local GovernmentLean peopleRef: Sec. 2(1)(a), Sec. 3(3), Sec. 5(1)
Who Is Most Affected
County auditors face increased administrative and financial responsibilities—including staffing, training, and equipment—for duplicating ballots and conducting audits. While this strengthens election integrity, it may strain resources, especially in smaller counties with limited budgets and staff.
Voters with damaged ballots benefit significantly, as the bill ensures their votes are preserved through duplication—provided intent is clear—preventing disenfranchisement due to physical ballot issues.
Political parties and campaigns gain formalized observer rights for audits, enhancing transparency and potentially increasing partisan oversight—but also raising concerns about potential observer intimidation or disruption if not properly managed.
The Secretary of State gains expanded rulemaking authority over audit methods and software approval, centralizing oversight and promoting uniformity—but also increasing administrative burden and requiring coordination with counties on technical standards.
Counties with limited budgets and staffing (especially rural or under-resourced) may struggle to meet the 72-hour audit deadline and implement new duplication and audit protocols without additional funding—potentially delaying certification or increasing error risk.